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This paper analyzes the discourse on Turkey in the Greek press, 
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Mass Media and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish 
Relations: discourse transformation in the Greek press 
1997-2003 
 
1. Introduction 
Media and communication studies are a fairly recent area of research in Greece 
and as a result very little work exists on the relation between foreign policy and 
mass media, unlike in other EU member-states.  Until the late 1990s, academic 
interest in the influence of the Greek media on either the formulation of public 
opinion or on policy-making was almost non-existent.  Nevertheless, contrary 
to what this lack of interest would suggest, the history of the Greek media, and 
particularly the press, are closely linked to the history of the modern Greek 
state and its identity1.  During the Greek Revolution, the spirit of the Greek 
fighters was captured in a number of papers that appeared at the time and 
remained in print after the declaration of the first independent Greek state in 
1831.  As early as the late 19th century, political reporting had become an 
established profession and 56 political papers were being printed in Athens out 
of 131 in the whole country (Mayer 1960).  Throughout the tumultuous history 
of the Greek state, which included, among other things, Italian and German 
occupations and two dictatorships (1936-1940 and 1967-1974), the press was 
often the sole carrier of ideas and principles that were otherwise outlawed, 
including the fundamental values and perceptions that held the Greek nation 
                                                 
1In fact, the first Greek newspaper, the Ephimeris, which was published in Vienna, 
was founded in order to assist the fight for national independence from the Ottoman 
Empire and develop a sense of national identity. 
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together and provided a basis for Greek national identity.  Thus, the press 
became an indispensable part of Greek political life with significant power. 
The relationship between Greek press and politics is manifested on two 
different levels. On the one hand, the press has traditionally served as a 
‘mouthpiece’ for political parties to reach a large audience and has thus 
functioned as a mechanism for the reinforcement of political beliefs, through 
what has been described as an “incestuous relationship between press and 
political parties” (Paraschos 1995).  On the other hand, Greece has been 
described as one of the states in which journalists and writers in the press have 
significant power in forming public opinion (Giallourides, 2001:18), but also, 
in setting the public policy agenda (Panagiotou 2003:4).  This interdependence 
between the Greek press, policy-making and public opinion suggests that the 
analysis of the press is an indispensable variable in the study of policy change, 
and, consequently, in the analysis of the reconsideration of Greek foreign 
policy and Greek-Turkish relations that took place in the late 1990s. 
This paper hypothesises that, given the nature and function of the print media 
in Greece, the transformation of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, which 
was manifested in the Greek decision to lift the veto on Turkey’s accession in 
1999, should also be reflected in the transformation of the discourse on Turkey 
in the Greek press. This hypothesis is tested through the systematic 
comparative analysis of the framing of this discourse in the mainstream Greek 
newspapers in 1997, 1999 and 2003, and specifically in the months of the 
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European Councils which reached significant decisions on Turkey’s application 
for membership. The study of narratives regarding the Turkish state aims to 
shed light on the role of the press in Greek foreign policy, and particularly to 
understand whether the reconsideration of Greek-Turkish relations in Greece 
was linked to a more positive discourse on Turkey in the Greek press.  Finally, 
the analysis also examines whether any observed transformation of the 
discourse in the press was guided by policies, beliefs, identities and principles 
emanating from the EU through the process of Europeanization, which has 
been credited as the driving force for the transformation of Greek foreign 
policy towards Turkey (Tsakonas 2003; Economides 2005). 
 
2. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Greek Press 
Until recently the scholarly literature has concurred that by and large the Greek 
press has contributed to the perpetuation of the turbulent relationship between 
Greece and Turkey by emphasizing nationalism in the Greek public space and 
by representing Turkey as the ‘Other’, along with the negative connotations 
that this entails.  Thus it has been argued that the mass media have played a 
significant role in the process of reproduction and reinforcement of 
ethnocentric and nationalist discourses (Ozgunes & Terzis 2000) and that the 
conflicts in the Aegean and in Cyprus may have been resolved a long time ago, 
had it not been for the consistent presentation of hostile images, prejudices and 
national stereotypes by the mass media (Giallourides 2001).  
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The analysis of stereotypes has, in fact, been used as the main method to 
understand the way in which the media - in the wider sense - perform their role 
in Greek-Turkish relations (Hadjidimos 1999; Giallourides 2001; Millas 2001; 
Panagiotou 2003; Kostarella 2007; Ozkirimli & Sofos 2008). In these studies, 
there is a general consensus that the Greek mass media have served to 
reproduce the established stereotypes regarding Turkey, that is the stereotypes 
derived from history and literature, and have sometimes reformulated these 
stereotypes in order to match particular circumstances.  In their conclusions it is 
observed that negative stereotypes of the Turks, which promote the abstract 
idea of Turkey as the ‘eternal enemy’, are abundant and constant across time: 
“This coverage works towards the continuation of the dispute, since it 
constructs a negative image of the ‘Other’” (Panagiotou 2003: 3). As the two 
countries have been historically posited as the ‘Other’ in their respective 
nationalist imaginaries, “engaged in parallel monologues in which each is seen 
as the ‘opposite’ to the survival of the other” (Ozkirimli & Sofos, 2008), the 
mobilisation of such feelings by the press brings life to the historically 
ingrained images and creates an environment susceptible to conflict.  On the 
other hand, these deep-rooted perceptions of Turkey are also seen to limit the 
press’s options to introduce varying discourses: 
The public is prepared to embrace explanations dominated by stereotypes that have 
been long ingrained by institutions such as school, church and family.  Therefore it 
is very difficult for the press to escape from this process and adopt new approaches 
(Kostarella, 2007: 30). 
Negative stereotypes of Turkey have traditionally involved images of the Turks 
as (a) barbarian (often referred to as Asian) and inferior in terms of civilisation; 
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(b) untrustworthy and not hesitating to go back on their word (c) fanatical, 
conservative, as well as fearful of progress and insecure against the West, and 
(d) anti-Christian and unholy tyrants (Millas 2001).  Therefore, direct or 
indirect allusion to these representations in the contemporary mass media is 
perceived as detrimental for societal support for rapprochement.  Focusing on 
the perpetuation of these images, the literature tends to attribute a rather 
negative role for the press in Greek-Turkish relations, and perceive the Greek-
Turkish case as an example of “how media promote the oppositional schema of 
us versus them, when defining national ‘Others’” (Kostarella, 2007: 27), and 
thus perpetuate conflict.   
 It can be argued that this one-sided claim is a result of the lack of 
comprehensive and balanced studies of the media in this function.  Until 
recently, the overarching majority of studies have focused on the attitudes of 
the media in moments of crisis between the two states, the most obvious 
example being the abundance of scholarly articles on the media discourse 
surrounding the Imia/Kardak crisis (for example Giallourides 2001; Panagiotou 
2003).  Given that nationalist discourses become more pronounced in moments 
of perceived crisis, studies which are limited to timeframes involving episodes 
of conflict are bound to discover discursive manifestations of pronounced 
nationalism.   
The emergence of a new research agenda, guided by the assumption that non-
governmental actors, including the media, have acted as promoters of the post-
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1999 rapprochement, has begun to reverse these potentially erroneous findings. 
Scholars who have engaged consistently with the image of Turkey in Greece, 
analysing the media in times of both turmoil and stability in bilateral relations, 
detect a shift towards abating the negative references to the ‘Other’ (Ker-
Lindsay 2000;  Millas, 2001; Rumelili, 2005).  In fact, it has been observed 
that, while the Greek media had traditionally legitimated hardliner policies 
against the ‘Other’, since the earthquakes in 1999 their influence has turned 
toward a progressive support of rapprochement (Rumelili 2005). However, the 
tendency to focus on the reporting of the 1999 earthquakes in order to deduce 
wider conclusions regarding the stance of the press errs on the opposite side of 
the studies that have focused on the Imia events.  The climate of compassion 
and friendship brought about by natural disaster may have enabled the media 
and the public to overlook the historical disputes and the relevant stereotypes, 
but only temporarily.  In order to assess whether a more permanent discursive 
change has taken place there is a need for a more in-depth analysis of 
discourses and narratives on Turkey in the mass media across time and events.   
Attempting to make up for this gap, this paper examines the evolution of the 
‘Turkey’ discourse in the Greek press at selected regular timeframes 
throughout the rapprochement period. In the following sections the 
representations of Turkey in the Greek press at specific ‘time points’ between 
1997 and 2003 are compared in order to deduce general conclusions about the 
discursive trends that accompanied the foreign policy transformation of 1999 
and its follow-up.  These ‘time points’ include three periods, namely:  
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a. Before and after the December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg, at 
which the EU leaders refused to endorse Turkey’s candidacy. The Greek 
veto featured as one of the main obstacles to Turkish accession and caused 
strong reactions in Ankara which led to a renewal of security concerns in 
the Aegean.  This, among other factors, led the Greek government to 
reconsiderations of its strategy towards Turkish accession. 
b. Before and after the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where 
the EU leaders agreed to endorse Turkey’s candidacy under certain 
conditions. The Greek official policy was to lift the veto and stress the 
importance of rapprochement, marking a definite reorientation of its foreign 
policy premises.  The transformation of the Greek strategy as manifested in 
Helsinki was accompanied by strong Euro-enthusiast rhetoric on the 
governmental level. 
c. The European Council meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003 which was 
considered as the moment of emancipation for Greece as a European state.  
The Council also made significant decisions for the future enlargement of 
the EU in which the Greek Presidency displayed support for reform in 
Turkey which would lead the country to its future accession to the EU.  
The study of narratives begins roughly from the 1996 Imia crisis, the most 
critical near-war incident between Greece and Turkey in the 1990s, and ends 
with the 2003 Greek Presidency.  The newspapers examined are the leading 
dailies, Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia, Kathimerini and To Vima, which accounted for 
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the majority of readership in the periods examined2. The sample of newspapers 
is comprised of the two leading morning newspapers (Kathimerini and To 
Vima) which account for approximately 83% of the morning press circulation; 
the two leading evening newspapers (Ta Nea and Eleftherotypia, in this order) 
which account for 46% of evening circulation, while the rest of the evening 
papers account for less that 10% each.  Finally, the sample includes the Sunday 
editions of To Vima (To Vima tis Kyriakis), Eleftherotypia (Kyriakatiki 
Eleftherotypia) and Kathimerini (Kathimerini tis Kyriakis)3, which led the 
Sunday market throughout the period of time examined in the paper accounting 
for approximately 60% of Sunday circulation. 
 
3. The 1997 Discourse: Turkey as the ‘Enemy’ 
The events leading up to the Luxembourg Summit, where Greece vetoed the 
Turkish application to join the EU, had a detrimental impact on the perception 
of Turkey in the Greek mass media.  The memory of the Imia/Kardak crisis had 
left a deep scar which led bilateral relations to one of their all-time lows. At the 
same time, developments in EU-Turkey relations had begun to unfold.  With 
the 1995 Customs Agreement signed and implemented, the Turkish state was 
now moving to its next goal: acquiring EU candidate status along with the 
                                                 
2
 Statistics drawn from the Greek Daily Newspaper Union databases (www.eihea.gr) 
and the European Journalism Centre. 
3
 Note that Ta Nea is not published on Sundays.  
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Eastern European applicant states, Malta and Cyprus, in the  December 1997 
Summit in Luxembourg.   
The process of political and national antagonism between Turkey and Greece 
up to this point and the events generated by this antagonism, as well as the 
developments on the European level, constitute the backdrop of the analysis of 
the 1997 Greek media, in which the discussion of Turkey, broadly defined, 
focused on its representation as the archetypal ‘Other’, emphasizing competing 
identity discourses and opposing the idea of Turkey as part of Europe. The 
representations of Turkey in December 1997, may be broadly summarized in 
the discursive categories - or narratives- which follow. 
3.1. Turkey as a military adversary 
Maintaining the narratives which have traditionally characterised Greek-
Turkish relations, the 1997 press continued to frame bilateral relations within a 
discourse of conflict and animosity, suggesting that war between the two 
countries should not be treated as an unlikely event.  The press based this on 
three basic arguments, namely the frequency of Turkish violations of the Greek 
airspace; the general direction of Turkish foreign policy, and particularly the 
alliance with the USA and Israel; and finally, near the end of the month, the 
provocative Turkish reaction to the European Council’s decisions. As a result, 
the sense of imminent  conflict permeated the print media.  This was 
particularly noticeable in the language employed in reports on the Luxembourg 
European Council, which was described at times as “a grand Greek victory” 
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(Eleftherotypia 14/12/1997) or as “the battle of Luxembourg” (To Vima 
14/12/1997), using metaphors such as the battle of Salamis, where the “small 
and fewer” Greeks defeated the “powerful and vast” Persian empire 
(Eleftherotypia 14/12/1997) or  Greece as David triumphing over the “Turkish 
Goliath” (To Vima 21/12/1997) . In addition, violations of the Greek airspace 
were mentioned with noteworthy frequency and were referred to as “the usual 
provocation” (Ta Nea 11/12/1997), “the familiar tactics” (To Vima 
14/12/1997) and similar terms denoting recurrence. It was also suggested that 
Turkey’s provocation was based on stirring up “non-existent” and “outrageous” 
issues in Greek-Turkish relations (Eleftherotypia 11/12/1997).  
Some commentaries blamed the consistency of Turkish provocation on the 
unstable and turbulent domestic situation faced by the ‘shaky’ Yilmaz-Ecevit 
government (Ta Nea 31/12/1997), which was confronted with insurmountable 
problems including the Kurdish issue, the Islamists, corruption and an 
unhealthy economy.  Thus, the emphasis on the critical state of Turkish 
political and socioeconomic affairs was incorporated in the discourse on the 
state of Greek - Turkish relations.   At the same time, reports on Turkish 
military expenditure were accompanied by apprehension about Turkish 
imperialism. This sentiment was captured in a characteristically cautious 
commentary in To Vima: 
Only those unaware of history cannot see, or pretend that they do not see where 
Ankara ‘is going’ with all of this: simply, it aims to reverse everything, which 
will enable it to revive the infamous Ottoman Empire. […] The ‘homme malade’ 
as the Europeans referred to the Sultan’s Empire, has now become the most 
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dangerous source of infection for the whole  Mediterranean and Middle Eastern 
area  (To Vima 21/12/1997).  
Heated scenarios were also produced on the basis of Ankara’s negative 
reactions to the Council’s conclusions.  Reports of any movement of Turkish 
military units, and particularly of  the reinforcement of the Turkish military 
power in Cyprus, were regarded as “the cause for this preoccupation” (To Vima 
14/12/1997: A23) in most dailies.  Headlines such as “[Turkey] Strikes again in 
the Aegean” (Ta Nea 30/12/1997) and reports that “some of the scenarios that 
are circulating in international diplomatic circles do not exclude the possibility 
of a military episode” (To Vima 14/12/1997: A23) recurred increasingly in the 
Greek press.  The idea was that Ankara would attempt to create a “heated 
episode by intensifying provocation in the Aegean in an effort to show its 
dissatisfaction with the decision of the Luxembourg Summit” (Ta Nea 
31/12/1997).  At the same time the statements of the Defence Minister did little 
to disperse the perception of war as likelihood as, in a major press conference 
near the end of the year, Akis Tsohatzopoulos characteristically stated that “the 
Greek Armed Forces are in a position to confront anything that might happen 
and any challenge” (Ta Nea 29/12/1997). 
3.2. Turkey as the ‘Other’ 
The discursive construction of Turkey as Europe’s ‘Other’ permeated the 
Greek press which emphasized that Turkish policy making, societal values and 
dominant attitudes clashed with the basic premises of what was understood as 
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‘European’4. This idea was promoted by the consistent publication of 
statements by politicians and experts who spoke of “Turkey’s insistence on 
disregarding all the values which form the contemporary European civilization” 
(To Vima 21/12/1997) and emphasized the existence of a wide-spread 
European belief that Turkey was not European or, as Ta Nea phrased it, “a 
perception on a Pan-European level that this state does not belong to the core of 
Europe” (21/12/1997).  
This ‘labelling’ of Turkey was often attributed to its refusal to endorse the ideas 
and principles on which the EU had based its construction.  As argued in Ta 
Nea, “while many EU states wish for closer ties with Turkey, they are however 
particularly annoyed with Ankara’s denial to take a step back and to accept 
principles that are taken for granted in any civilized western country” (Ta Nea 
11/12/1997).  In this context, the view held by the press was that becoming part 
of Europe would be up to the Turkish state itself.   Repeating the words of the 
Greek Commissioner, To Vima explained: 
It is up to Turkey itself to prove with actions that it is interested in a close 
relationship with the EU, to actively prove that it respects the basic values of 
European society. Turkey must realize that good neighbourly relations and 
cooperation with Greece are a fundamental condition for the upgrading of its 
relations with the EU (To Vima 14/12/1997; A20). 
The suggestion deriving from this statement was that better relations with 
Greece, would make Turkey more ‘European’ and vice-versa, that a more 
European Turkey would pursue rapprochement.  Consistent with this view was 
                                                 
4
 For more on the notion of Turkey as Europe’s ‘Other’ see Diez, T. (2004); 
Neumann, I. (1996); Neumann, I. (1999); Triandafyllidou, A. (1998); Robins, K. 
(1996). 
  13 
the papers’ criticism of Ankara’s manner of rejection of the Luxembourg 
Conclusions: “in essence what Ankara rejected was not the stabilization of its 
relations with Athens on the basis of Greek terms, but the acceptance of the 
general principles which guide the European states” (To Vima 21/12/1997).   
While this constructivist approach to Turkey’s ‘otherness’ left open the 
possibility of change towards a more European Turkey, elsewhere in the papers 
more essentialist arguments for Turkey’s ideational misfit with the EU found 
their way into the public discourse.   These arguments drew on history, but also 
on the Islamist and Kemalist traditions of the Turkish state, in order to 
accentuate the divide marked by the Aegean and disperse the idea that Turkey 
held a rightful place among European states.  Indicatively, soon after the 
European Council, one op-ed argued that: 
Neither the Ottoman Empire previously, nor Turkey during the twentieth century 
has been accepted by the West as ‘west’.  They do not belong in what Voltaire 
called the ‘Big Democracy’[…] For Westerners Turkey is a foreign, ‘different’ 
place, a culturally, socially, institutionally, but also geographically ‘exotic’ place 
(Ta Nea 19/12/1997).  
Turkish Islam also featured in the discussion of the country’s western identity 
in the Greek papers, which commented on the clash between “the Muslim 
tradition and the western way of life that many in Turkey have adopted” (Ta 
Nea 31/12/1997) as a problematic situation.  The antagonism between Islamists 
and the military establishment in Turkish politics was heavily criticized as a 
non-European phenomenon and was used to argue that Turkey did not resemble 
a European state guided by the principles embedded in the EU Treaties: “They 
have generals, they have the National Security Council and they have 
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Islamists” (Eleftherotypia 24/12/1997)  was the general idea repeated often.  
Eleftherotypia spoke of a Turkish “inability to adapt to western standards” 
(22/12/1997). Further commentary concluded that “Turkey cannot change its 
organisational ‘philosophy’ and the way the state is run without serious and 
radical social, political and economic reforms; only then would there be a 
completely ‘European Turkey’” (Kathimerini 15/12/1997).  On a less 
optimistic note, Eleftherotypia suggested that even the strengthening of ties 
with Europe would not prevent Islam from threatening Turkey, which justified 
“Huntington’s view that Turkey [would] remain a divided country” 
(Eleftherotypia  22/12/1997). 
The human rights issue also featured prominently in the discourse on an 
uncivilized, non-Western Turkey.  The striking antithesis between the 
principles and values that Europe was considered to represent and the violation 
of those principles in Turkey was used to accentuate the perceived ‘otherness’.  
The revelation of the  methods of torture used against Turkish leftwing 
journalists in Ta Nea was accompanied by the comment “at the same time that 
Turkey claims a place in Europe, the journalist Ilan Karatepe reveals: in the 
Turkish prisons they are crucifying people!” (Ta Nea 23/12/1997).  The 
conclusion, once again, repeated this exclamation from another paper: “How in 
the world can the medieval regime of Ankara ask to be accepted in the club of 
well-mannered Europeans?” (Ta Nea 20/12/1997). A “military establishment 
which, more and more openly, holds the power” (Kathimerini 29/12/1997), “an 
increasing wave of religious fanaticism” (Ta Nea 30/12/1997) and an unstable 
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political, economic and social situation were recurring phrases which captured 
the construction of Turkey as an ‘Other’ to the idealised notion of Europe. 
3.3. Turkey’s special relationship with the USA 
Preoccupations regarding the restructuring of NATO and the related 
implications for Greek-Turkish relations often appeared in the 1997 Greek 
press, framing the bilateral relations within a NATO/USA5 discourse.   
Conveniently playing up the anti-American sentiment of the time, which was 
caused by the manner of American intervention in the Imia/Kardak crisis and 
the suspicion surrounding the restructuring of NATO, the portrayal of Turkey 
as the USA’s ‘favourite’ became a recurring theme.   
In the aftermath of the European Council in Luxembourg, suspicion towards 
the bond between Turkey and the US increased in the press.  The Washington 
talks between President Clinton and the Turkish Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, 
were given particular attention on the daily agenda, and were often presented as 
possible conspiracies against Greece given the critical timing for NATO.  
American indifference towards issues of vital national importance for Greece 
was highlighted as, for example, in an Eleftherotypia article characteristically 
entitled “The Aegean and Cyprus are details” (20/12/1997).  In the article, the 
minimal inclusion of Greek-Turkish problems in the agenda of the Yilmaz-
Clinton meetings was attributed to the fact that Turkey served more significant 
American purposes.  “The problems in Cyprus and the Aegean”, the article 
                                                 
5
 In Greek Anti-American discourse NATO and the US tend to be treated as one and 
the same (see Tsakona 2006).  
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concluded, “were sacrificed on the altar of greater American geopolitical 
interests which are served by Turkey’s geographical position” (Eleftherotypia 
20/12/1997).  Various commentaries emphasized that Turkey itself was aware 
of its significance within NATO and its special bond with the USA and was 
using that to its advantage.   Indirectly this enhanced the belief that, in case of a 
military conflict, the US would side with Turkey against Greece, feeding an 
already heated climate.  This fear was reinforced by the belief that the USA’s 
‘soft-spot’ for Turkey would affect NATO’s new command structures in the 
Aegean.  Indicatively, in early December 1997 To Vima exclaimed  that “with 
the new Confidence Building Measures and the new air command 
administrative system, in the end the Turks will invade the Aegean with 
NATO’s blessings and seal of approval” (To Vima 07/12/1997).   
It is noteworthy that, at the time, NATO and the US were mentioned as 
significant factors in the majority of reports and editorials on Turkey’s potential 
EU accession.  The narrative behind this was that the US were pursuing closer 
bonds with Turkey through what the Greek press referred to as the “Eurasia’” 
project (Eleftherotypia 02/12/1997), a plan to westernize Turkey by putting 
pressure on the EU for an early Turkish accession, and then to use Turkey as a 
model for the reform of the more central Asian Muslim states, as well as a 
military asset in the region.  This belief was characteristically reflected, for 
example, in Ta Nea which reported that “the American side is expressing in 
every way possible the fact that it considers Turkey to be very important for the 
West” (Ta Nea 31/12/1997). The idea that the EU could be used by the US to 
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serve the latter’s interests, sacrificing its own independence, caused 
considerable discomfort in the Greek media, which repeatedly quoted 
government officials statements that  “it is the Europeans who should decide 
about European institutions” (Kostas Simitis in Eleftherotypia 02/12/1997) and 
that  “The USA is an important partner. But it is not Europe’s custodian” 
(Christos Papoutsis in To Vima 14/12/1997). 
This manner of reporting constituted a break with the Greek media’s tradition 
of referring to Europe and the US as one, as the ‘West’ or the ‘great powers’, a 
remnant of the country’s history of having its fate decided by external powers 
(Tsakona 2006).  This time, however, a clear distinction was made between the 
US and the EU in terms of their interests and intentions.  In this context, one 
paper maintained that Turkey would have two options: “either it [could] remain 
with the support of Washington and basically become an agent of American 
interests in the region; or it [could] try and conform to the principles that guide 
the European states and later become a member of the European family” (To 
Vima 21/12/1997). 
3.4. Turkey’s lack of respect for International/European Law 
A final narrative regarding Turkey, which was cultivated strongly in the press, 
especially after the negative Turkish reactions to the Luxembourg Conclusions, 
was that of the “law-defying” state.  Turkey’s refusal to abide by international 
and European legal conventions was repeatedly pointed out by commentators 
who juxtaposed the Turkish stance to the idea of the EU as a community of 
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rules and norms. The Greek newspapers gradually endorsed the government’s 
position that Turkey’s candidacy would not be out of the question if signs of 
respect for the legal system that governed the EU, and particularly for 
“democratic institutions, good neighbourhood, use and acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the Hague, respect for external borders and territorial 
sovereignty of states, endorsement of the UN decisions” (Kathimerini 
15/12/1997) were shown by the neighboring state.  Yet, it was repeatedly 
emphasized that so far Turkey had given very few indications of its willingness 
to comply.  
The Greek Prime Minister’s concern over Turkey’s lack of respect for the 
international legal system was reflected in all major Greek newspapers, which 
maintained that it was “inconceivable that [an applicant] state would create 
difficulties and objections” (Eleftherotypia 02/12/1997) to the EU’s conditions.  
Within this context, the Greek-Turkish disputes were framed as only one of 
many manifestations of Turkey’s disregard of European conventions and ‘ways 
of doing things’:  
Turkey doubts the existing borders of the EU and is demanding a reconsideration of the 
European legal order which has become institutionalized after World War II.  
Therefore, it is wrong to regard the issue as a matter of bilateral relations since it 
concerns the generally accepted rules of Europe (Kostas Simitis in Eleftherotypia 
13/12/1997).   
This approach reflected the “our problems are Europe’s problems” discourse,  
according to which  the dissatisfaction with the Turkish attitude towards 
international/European conventions reflected a wider European concern.  In 
order to support this claim, the Greek press quoted various EU leaders and 
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officials, such as  Danish PM Rasmussen’s statement that “Turkey is not in a 
position to be in the same category as other candidate states and it is definitely 
not allowed to have territorial claims over an EU member-state” (To Vima  
21/12/1997); EU Commission President Jacques Santer’s exclamation that 
“Turkey’s refusal to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICJ will not be tolerated” 
(To Vima 21/12/1997); as well as Luxembourg PM Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
conviction that “representatives of states where human torture is taking place 
cannot be sitting around the same table with the EU” (Ta Nea 13/12/1997). The 
latter alluded to Turkey’s refusal to abide by international conventions on 
human rights.   Two major papers referred to  the Belgian Prime Minister’s 
statement that “Turkey must realise that we are not a Christian Club, but a club 
with principles and rules that it ought to respect, if it aspires to be a member” 
(Eleftherotypia 18/12/1997; Ta Nea 18/12/1997).   
Particular attention was given to the continuing violation of human rights in 
Turkey, which was in direct contrast to the Copenhagen criteria.  The Greek 
press maintained that while the Turkish government was attempting to create 
fake images of change, it was secretly continuing to engage in the same 
practices that had been condemned.  Ta Nea, for example, reminded its readers 
that: 
Turkey [had] repeatedly announced a series of democratization measures on the 
eve of discussions of its application for accession in the Community.  Similarly in 
1995, when the Customs Union was about to be decided, a number of imprisoned 
journalists had been freed among other measures; they were arrested again on 
other charges soon after the agreement was signed (Ta Nea 05/12/1997).   
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Particular emphasis was given to the Kurdish issue, which was viewed as an 
indicative example of disregard of the criteria.  As commented in 
Eleftherotypia: 
the waves of Kurdish refugees that arrive in Europe persecuted by the inhuman 
Turkish policies widen the distance between Ankara and Brussels.  Not only does 
that justify the recent decision of the European Council to set preconditions for 
Turkey’s inclusion in the list of candidate countries, it also alienates Turkey from 
the European public opinion (Eleftherotypia 30/12/1997).  
This image of Turkey was juxtaposed to the simultaneous representation of Greece as 
a crusader for international law.  This was illustrated, for example, in a To Vima 
interview which emphasised that “Greece must continue to demand consistently that 
Turkey respect International Law […] We must make clear that Greece is interested in 
the creation of relations of peace, stability and cooperation in the whole region” 
(14/12/1997). 
4. The 1999 Discourse: A Sceptical Rapprochement 
As a follow-up to the process launched in Luxembourg,  the European Council 
met in Helsinki in December 1999 to discuss enlargement within the wider 
scope of the European Union’ future. Following intense debate regarding the 
approach that the Luxembourg Council had taken towards the Turkish 
accession, the EU overcame the long-lasting ambiguity over the Turkish case. 
In the Helsinki Conclusions reference was made to thirteen and not twelve 
candidate states, with Turkey. clearly situated in the enlargement process along 
with the other candidates. According to Atila Eralp “these conclusions 
regarding Turkey were drastically different from Luxembourg: they were more 
open, inclusive and less discriminatory. As a result, the Turkish élite viewed 
  21 
the Helsinki conclusions quite positively as correcting the mistakes of 
Luxembourg” (Eralp, 2000: 8). 
Agreement to these conclusions marked a significant shift in the Greek stance 
towards Greek-Turkish relations which had been particularly unstable during 
the previous years6.  The negative climate had been accentuated by the Greek 
as well as the Turkish media.  In the time between the Luxembourg and 
Helsinki Councils, in the Greek press Turkey was often depicted as uncivilised 
and its claim of ‘belonging to Europe’ as baseless and ridiculous.  In May 
1998, Kathimerini referred to Turkey as a “pseudo-democracy, […] supervised 
by a military leadership playing a ‘guarantor’s role”, while Eleftherotypia 
openly opposed Turkey’s potential candidacy for EU membership referring to 
the “anti-democratic militarist regime in Ankara […], the massacres of  Kurds, 
the violation of human rights, the permanent presence of Attila7 in Cyprus and 
the contempt of International Law” (22/05/1998).  
In early 1999, Greek-Turkish relations deteriorated still further after the arrest 
of the persecuted leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), Abdullah 
Ocalan, in Nairobi in February.  Shortly after the arrest, the revelation that 
Ocalan had found refuge within the Greek embassy in Kenya triggered a 
                                                 
6
 According to Tsakonas “the decisions of the Councils in Luxembourg and Cardiff 
rendered the bad climate between Greece and Turkey even worse, as the 
postponement of the debate on Turkish candidacy was linked - once more - with the 
conscious Greek choice to keep the EU door closed to Turkey” (Tsakonas, 2003: 51). 
7
 Attila was the code-name given to the Turkish military invasion of the island of 
Cyprus in July 1974 in response to a Greek-inspired coup d'etat which sought to unite 
the island with Greece.  
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disruption of Greek-Turkish ties as Turkey leaked reports that Ocalan had 
“confessed” during interrogation to receiving substantial aid from Greece for 
the PKK. In reaction, the Greek newspapers maintained that Turkey - with the 
USA’a assistance - was using the Ocalan case to stigmatise Greece’s image by 
depicting it as a state harbouring terrorism.  It was emphasised that, in the wake 
of the affair, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, had stated that “Turkey 
will not talk with Greece about the Aegean, Cyprus or any other important 
problem” (Reuters 05/03/1999) and the Turkish government was often accused 
of using the Ocalan case as an excuse  for its inflexibility in the resolution of 
bilateral problems.  
Shortly after the Ocalan affair had calmed down, the Kosovo war and the air 
campaign launched by NATO in former Yugoslavia (March-June 1999) took 
over the headlines in the Greek press.  The collective fear of an escalating war 
spreading across the Balkans and Southeastern Europe seemingly appeased the 
hostile climate in Greek-Turkish relations to some extent.  The governments of 
the two countries agreed not to allow the war in the neighbouring Balkans to 
provoke an armed combat between them.  There had been plausible fears of 
such a consequence, since, in addition to the traditionally difficult bilateral 
relations between the two countries, their views on NATO’s military campaign 
differed.   The countries’ mutual concern about the stability of the region and 
their relations with the EU eventually led to a non-conflict agreement which 
had a profound impact on the cultivation of a positive climate between Greece 
and Turkey, leading the  Greek President to remark: “I had never thought that  
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a way to avoid the possibility (of a war between Greece and Turkey) would be 
the bombing of Serbia” (NET  24/03/1999).  This initial rapprochement was 
linked to the Greek change of policy regarding Turkey’s EU membership, or so 
it would seem from the writings of the Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, 
who in December 1999 wrote: 
With the harrowing war in Kosovo still fresh in our memories, the Greek people 
are critically aware of the importance of good neighborly relations.  We believe 
that our neighbor’s strength is our strength.  To exclude a country from the full 
benefits of international society is a sure path to the kind of crises we have faced 
for too long in South-Eastern Europe (International Herald Tribune, Kathimerini 
English Edition 10/12/1999). 
The devastating earthquakes in Greece and Turkey in 1999 took this sentiment 
further in the public consciousness.  Greek aid to the Turkish people was 
accompanied by extensive press reports focusing on community-building 
between the two nations.  This spirit of solidarity was captured in the mass 
media on both sides of the Aegean (Ker-Lindsay, 1999: 219) and allowed for 
more positive narratives to surface. The gradual rapprochement was reflected in 
official relations between the two states.  One New York Times editorial 
strikingly captured the change by suggesting that Greece had now become 
Turkey’s strongest supporter in the EU and that  “Turkey is hoping that Greece 
will help persuade the 15-nation Union to add Turkey to the list of prospective 
members” (13/11/1999).  The manifestation of this change came in 1999 at the 
European Summit in Helsinki, where the Greek government expressed its 
decision to no longer block Turkish candidacy.  As the official policy line 
underwent a significant transformation, the discourse on Turkey in the mass 
media was restructured around the narrative categories analysed here. 
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4.1. Turkey and military conflict 
While the depiction of Greek-Turkish relations in the Greek press remained 
rather consistent in the years between the Luxembourg and Helsinki European 
Councils, it is, however, possible to discern some elements of a more positive 
discourse on Turkey in the 1999 press in contrast to that of 1997.  This change 
was manifested through the endorsement of the position that, by withdrawing 
the veto on Turkish accession and engaging Turkey in pre-accession 
negotiations, Greece would open up the path for stability, development and 
peace in the Balkans.  In contrast to the narrative cultivated in the previous 
years, this proposition was as groundbreaking as the Foreign Ministry’s policy 
change itself.  However, it ran the risk of not appealing to public opinion and 
appearing unconvincing when juxtaposed to centuries of cultivation of the 
narrative of Turkey as an enemy.  
One mechanism employed by the press to moderate this problem was to 
transform Greek perceptions of Turkish intentions, with a particular focus on 
Turkish politicians.  Thus, the papers highlighted the positive efforts of certain 
Turkish government officials, and particularly of the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
as well of particular Turkish milieus which Eleftherotypia described as “the 
Europhile powers of the neighbour and all those who wish to escape the control 
of the armed forces and to build a democracy, as we know it in the West” 
(13/12/1999).  This acknowledgement was captured in the words of the Greek 
Foreign Minister which were reported in most Greek news sources in the week 
before the European Council:  “If things go well in Helsinki and Turkey 
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becomes a candidate state, this will be to a great extent thanks to Turkey’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismael Cem” (Ta Nea 08/12/1999).  Eleftherotypia 
described Cem’s upcoming visit to Athens as initiating a ‘new  era’ 
(13/12/1999) and spoke of a ‘historic turn’ (12/12/1999) in the Turkish 
establishment, while To Vima welcomed Papandreou’s statement that 
“whatever the result of Helsinki, I hope that we will continue in this new 
course, this new opportunity, the new climate that has evolved between the two 
countries” (To Vima 08/12/1999) and Kathimerini made reference to ‘new 
horizons’ opening up for the country after Helsinki (Kathimerini 12/12/1999).  
As a consequence of this shift, the war-related narrative of Turkey as the 
archetypal ‘Enemy’ changed fundamentally from 1997 to 1999 and the idea 
that Turkey could attack at any minute was slowly abandoned.  Nevertheless, it 
would be naïve to suggest that suspicion of Turkish intentions evaporated from 
the Greek media discourse.  It would perhaps be safer to claim that such 
attitudes were less pronounced, or that they were addressed alongside the 
suggestion that through the EU Turkey’s ‘comportment’ could be controlled.  
Thus, conditionality acquired increased significance. Ta Nea, for example, 
emphasised that “the inflexible stance held by Turkey on the issue of bilateral 
relations with Greece […would] be maintained with greater stubbornness in 
case the EU [recognised] Turkey as a candidate state for accession without first 
witnessing the realization of the conditions that have been set” (Ta Nea 
04/12/1999).  These conditions referred to the criteria agreed upon by the 
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European Council in Copenhagen and Luxembourg8, but also to the demands 
that Greece was about to put forth in the Helsinki Council in exchange for the 
withdrawal of its veto, namely agreeing on a specific roadmap for Turkish 
accession, getting the candidate states to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICJ in 
bilateral disputes (so as to take the matter of the Aegean to that level), and 
securing Cypriot accession without the prior resolution of the Cyprus problem 
as a precondition. 
4.2. Turkey as the ‘Other’: Emphasis on Human Rights 
In spite of the more positive climate, the persecution of PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan and the events following his flight had a strong impact on the negative 
perception of the Turkish state and offered the Greek press a chance to 
highlight the contradictions between conditions in Turkey and in Europe, 
particularly in the area of human and minority rights.  Consequently,  the 
Kurdish issue became an important part of the discourse on Turkey as the 
‘Other’, but in a more ‘EU-specific context’ this time.  Turkey’s stance towards 
the Kurdish minority was treated as an indication of  Turkey’s inability to 
comply with EU norms, as well as with the legal demands of the European 
Court of Human Rights not to execute the PKK leader.  It was also framed as 
an incompatibility of principles and values between Turkey and Europe.  
                                                 
8
 The Copenhagen Criteria and excerpts from the Luxembourg Conclusions were 
repeatedly cited in the press, even without commentary, in way of a reminder of what 
the collective EU stance was on the Turkish issue.  All four major dailies published 
the criteria in one form or another on the weekend of the 11th and 12th December 
1999.  
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The main communication technique which was employed was the frequent 
reference to multiple credible sources with ‘high authority’9, such as opinion 
makers and commentators from other EU members and EU institutions, 
condemning Turkey’s human rights record and indirectly emphasising the 
‘otherness’ discourse. On the eve of the European Council, for example, Ta 
Nea published a piece on the European Court of Human Rights verdict 
condemning Turkey for banning the pro-Kurdish party of Freedom and 
Democracy (OZDEP) in 1993.  “Amnesty International”, it reported, “is calling 
for the EU to put pressure on Turkey for Human Rights issues and the Ocalan 
execution as conditions for accession” (Ta Nea 10/12/99).   Eleftherotypia drew 
on the Belgian press’s condemnation of the state of human rights in Turkey. To 
Vima (10/12/99) made reference to a Human Rights Watch organisation report 
which stated, among other things, that “the Council of Europe 
[condemned]Turkey for serious human rights violations, the treatment of 
minorities and the lack of control over the army.  It is underlined that these are 
the main reasons why Turkey remains out of the EU enlargement process”.  
While the human rights issue received particular attention, due to the recent 
events surrounding the Ocalan ‘fiasco’, other narratives on Turkey’s 
‘Otherness’, such as religion, were noticeably absent in the 1999 press, 
particularly when compared to two years earlier.  This observation suggests 
that the acceptance of Turkey as a potential EU member on the state-level was - 
                                                 
9
 According to media studies one of the variables affecting news construction and 
effects is the selection of sources as “messages that are attributed to more credible 
sources will be associated with heightened persuasion” (Perse 2001:89).    
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to an extent - reflected in the public communicative discourses in the mass 
media. 
4.3. Turkey’s special bond with the USA 
As in 1997, in 1999 the Greek press continued to link Turkey’s relations with 
the EU to its bond with the USA of which it remained highly critical.  In the 
run-up to the European Council in Helsinki, the press often alluded to the 
American stance being biased in favour of Turkey and its accession to the EU, 
consistent with the belief that Turkey remained under the wing of the USA.  
The decisive - according to the Greek press - role of the US in the negotiations 
in Helsinki and their outcome was greeted with discontent and disappointment 
with the EU’s weakness to stand up to the superpower.  It was felt that such a 
degree of external pressure contradicted the EU's raison d’être and the rules 
guiding its existence.  Apprehensive commentators detected an increasing 
submission of European policy-making to the ‘American hegemony’ and its 
geopolitical concerns in the Helsinki Conclusions.  In Ta Nea, for example, 
Panayotis Ifaistos wrote: 
Turkey’s position is being continuously upgraded due to its geopolitical importance 
and its exceptional diplomacy. [Turkey’s] candidate status is only the beginning of 
a great Turko-European and Euro-American bargain in which Greece, due to its 
small political weight […], is condemned to stand in the sidelines and watch as an 
opponent whose hegemonic behaviour continually increases, is granted upgraded 
status (15/12/1999). 
Elsewhere, in Eleftherotypia,  the EU was described as a “satellite” of the US 
on the Turkish issue (14/12/1999). 
  29 
Suspicion of the USA’s motives generated talk of a ‘greater American scheme’, 
in which Turkey would hold the part of the “democratic Muslim state which 
would ‘attract’ the other states of the region” (Eleftherotypia 05/12/1999:10) 
and extend western influence to the crucial regions of the Middle East and the 
Caspian. Some commentators believed that for the sake of this scheme the US 
would be willing to overlook the violation of principles which were integral to 
the EU and to Greece.  These sentiments were particularly pronounced in the 
commentaries on US President Clinton’s address to the Turkish Parliament on 
the occasion of his visit to Turkey for the OECD Summit in Istanbul.10  The 
Greek press maintained that “the President of the USA made clear in various 
ways that for his country the priority is the recognition of Turkey as a candidate 
state for EU membership by the EU states” (Ta Nea 04/12/1999).  
Eleftherotypia characterized Clinton’s stance as hypocritical, since, on the one 
hand, he had refused to meet with representatives of the Turkish military 
establishment because of the ‘undemocratic’ nature of the institution, yet on the 
other, he applauded Turkey’s important military role, and commended Turkey 
on its role as a pillar of democracy and peace in a region “surrounded by 
neighbors that are actively hostile towards democracy” (06/12/1999: 8-9).     
Criticism was also directed towards Turkey for using Clinton’s discourse on 
democracy in order to justify the existence of institutions in Turkey that the EU 
deemed undemocratic.  This was in -part - a reaction to the Turkish Prime 
                                                 
10
 This visit had been preceded by a visit to Athens with the purpose of initiating the 
invitation towards the two communities of Cyprus to discussions. 
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Minister’s position that, neither the Turkish Constitution as it stood, nor the 
role of the National Security Council, should constitute problems for Turkish 
accession as “there [were] similar mechanism in place in the USA” 
(Eleftherotypia 14/12/1999).  Further criticism regarded Turkey’s allegiance to 
Washington and the conviction that Ankara only conformed when instructed to 
do so by the US administration.  The suggestion by many Greek journalists was 
that, in the final stages of the Helsinki Council, the Turkish government would 
not have accepted the conditions under which it had been granted candidate 
status, had it not been for the intervention of the United States. They pointed 
out that “crucial in Mr. Ecevit’s ‘turn’ was his telephone communication with 
Bill Clinton, […], during which the American President said ‘Congratulations 
Mr.Prime Minister. Your country is a candidate for EU membership and we 
consider that very positive progress’” (Ta Nea 11/12/1999:14-15 & 
Eleftherotypia 11/12/1999: 7). 
4.4. Turkey’s  lack of respect for the European ‘way of doing things’ 
Consistently with earlier narratives, Turkey continued to be depicted as lacking 
respect towards the international and European legal systems.  The view of 
Turkey communicated through the Greek press was that of a state refusing to 
accept the norms governing the EU and its relations with potential candidate 
states.   While other applicant and candidate states were portrayed in a constant 
effort to comply with the EU criteria and to adapt their internal and external 
policies to what was considered ‘EU standard’, thus becoming players in a 
game set out and refereed by the EU, Turkey was depicted as wanting to 
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enforce its own rules by pursuing a strategy of threats, a strategy that it had 
consistently followed in its relations with Greece.   The words ‘threat’ and 
‘blackmail’ found their way into the discussion on the Helsinki negotiations 
frequently, as in Ta Nea, which reported that: 
The spirit of … civilised negotiations within the EU is now being threatened by 
Ankara. The Turkish President Suleyman Demirel in his crudest blackmail up to 
now warned that ‘if Greece adopts a negative position [in Helsinki], the current 
climate of rapprochement will come to an end and our relations will be 
characterised by tension (Ta Nea 07/12/1999: 5).   
By suggesting that both Europe and Greece  constituted recipients of Turkey’s 
threats and disrespect, the Greek media constructed two mutually reinforcing 
narratives: on the one hand, the conflict was represented as a European rather 
than a bilateral one;  on the other, the ‘Us’ (Europe) vs. ‘Them’ (Turkey) idea 
was accentuated, depicting Turkey as incompatible with the  EU ‘way of doing 
things’.  
The image of Turkey as a ‘bad player’, relying on a strategy of defiance, 
arrogance, threats and demands, was maintained in the reports and 
commentaries on Ankara’s reception of the Helsinki Conclusions.  The Turkish 
discontent with the conditional offer was elaborated in all four major daily 
newspapers.  This reaction was treated with surprise and disbelief at Ankara’s 
ingratitude and unwillingness to compromise. To Vima’s front page set the 
tone: “Ankara’s reaction to the EU’s decision to characterise it as a candidate 
country was numb. For a moment, one almost thought that Ankara would reply 
that it would not accept the Conclusions” (To Vima 11/12/1999).   At the same 
time, it was brought to the public’s attention that this would not be the first 
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incidence of Turkish refusal to conform to EU Council conclusions.  In 1997, 
Ankara had rejected the Luxembourg Conclusions as unacceptable and had cut 
off its relations with the EU for that reason.  “After that Turkish…thriller, it 
was obvious to the European diplomats that Ankara was either attempting a last 
renegotiation effort or was playing ‘games’ to serve some kind of internal 
negotiation” (Ta Nea 11/12/1999).  
This repeated indifference to EU decision-making structures and processes 
implied that perhaps the country was not suitable to be an EU member; it was 
also linked to the usual depiction of Turkey as arrogant and lacking respect for 
the rules governing the EU.  In contrast to the Union’s dedication to the rule of 
law, Turkey was depicted as possessing an overall disrespect towards rules, 
refusing to resolve disputes through the internationally accepted legal 
institutions, such as the ICJ, and to endorse the acquis communautaire and the 
conditionality of enlargement. 
 
5. The 2003 Discourse: A New Era 
On 1st January  2003 Greece took over the European Council Presidency for the 
fourth time.  The Greek government viewed the Presidency as an opportunity to 
enhance Greece’s new image as a stable European state and strong regional 
actor (Panayotis Ioakimidis, Interview 06/06/2003). Alongside Simitis stood 
Foreign Minister George Papandreou, widely credited with transforming Greek 
foreign policy towards Turkey.  With regards to Greek-Turkish relations, the 
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Presidency maintained a low profile. In his speeches the Greek Prime Minister 
emphasised the Greek support for its neighbour’s European aspirations, adding 
that “one of the goals of the Presidency will be to help Turkey find its place in 
the European family and grasp the opportunity to implement the reforms which 
will bring it closer to the EU” (Kathimerini 15/01/2003). As the papers 
reported, the Presidency Conclusions emphasised the EU’s support for the 
Turkish government, welcoming its commitment “to carry forward the reform 
process, in particular the remaining legislative work by the end of 2003, and 
[supporting] its on-going efforts in order to fulfil the Copenhagen political 
criteria for opening accession negotiations with the Union” (Council of the 
European Union, Presidency Conclusions, June 2003, Paragraph 38).  In this 
spirit, the discourse on Turkey in the Greek press marked a significant 
departure from its traditional narrative lines. 
5.1. War Discourse & Turkish provocation in the Aegean played down 
Reports of bilateral hostility declined steadily in June 2003. In the sample of 
newspapers studied - with the noticeable exception of Kathimerini - a 
significantly smaller number of reports and editorials produced by the keyword 
‘Turkey’ made reference to the Turkish airspace violations in the Aegean, in 
spite of the fact that the first semester of 2003 was characterised by an increase 
in violations of the Athens FIR  (To Vima 08/06/2003).  It would appear that the 
press, alongside the government, engaged in a consistent effort to downplay 
hostility and promote other approaches to the resolution of disputes in the 
Aegean, in particular, that of ‘Europeanising’ bilateral relations.   
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While war and aggression were presented as a fatal strategy for Greece, the 
resolution of bilateral issues through the EU was encouraged now more than 
ever, with To Vima, for example, advising that: 
The Greek side must not fall into the trap of engaging in heated scenarios that the 
Turkish military are setting up in the Aegean […] The real battle must be given in 
Europe with the aim of cultivating the perception that Turkish aggression in the 
Aegean and in Cyprus will ultimately close the door of accession for Turkey (To 
Vima 18/05/2003).   
This conviction, which reflected the government’s stance, was even supported 
by the more conservative Kathimerini which highlighted the Minister of 
Defence, Ioannis Papantoniou’s statement, that “any policy which would push 
Turkey to the margins of the International Community and of the EU would 
enhance Turkey’s defensive reflexes and would render the neighbour even 
more dangerous than it is today” (11/06/2003).   
The press emphasised that Turkey’s provocative behaviour towards Greece 
could hinder its European course and that Greek policy-makers should use this 
as a negotiating card in the resolution of the bilateral dispute on the airspace.  
“Athens”, concluded one commentary, “must make clear that it will never 
consent to Turkish accession to the EU, if it continues to exhibit - and increase 
- its hostility” (Kathimerini 10/06/2003).  At the same time, and in contrast to 
previous years, the provocative Turkish acts in the Aegean were interpreted as 
“an indication of internal conflicts between the political leadership and the 
military establishment” (Ta Nea 14/06/2003).  The escalation of the clash 
between government and military in Turkey was captured in the titles of the 
leading Greek dailies, such as “The civil war continues in Turkey” 
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(Eleftherotypia 01/06/2003); “The clash for power in Turkey” (Eleftherotypia 
09/06/2003); “What are the generals after?” (Ta Nea 18/06/2003); 
“Intensification of the ‘Cold war’ in Ankara” (Kathimerini 03/06/2003). It was 
reported that  “the Turkish military establishment does not even inform the 
Minister of Defence about the moves, targets and strategy that the armed forces 
are pursuing” (To Vima 18/06/2003) and that the  Turkish Minister of Defence 
“does not have absolute control of the military movements of his state and in 
most cases is not even informed about the flights of military aircraft” (To Vima 
11/06/2003).  These headlines echoed the statements of the Greek government 
spokesman who, in an interview regarding the provocation of the Turkish air 
force, stated that “there is [in Turkey] a government which declares the 
principles of peace and friendship, and a military establishment which is 
pursuing polarisation, inflexibility and fanaticism” (Kathimerini 11/06/2003).   
The evidence of a strong domestic clash in Ankara, led the majority of Greek 
journalists to endorse the view that the Turkish military, and not the 
government, was the actor behind the increasing provocation in the Aegean. 
This was captured in To Vima, where one report concluded: 
The study of the list of FIR violations leads to the undoubted conclusion that they 
have increased significantly since the new government under Tayyip Erdogan 
came into power, thus reflecting the intense domestic dispute between the 
familiar military establishment, which is resisting reform, and the new 
government which wishes to implement reform  (To Vima 18/06/2003).   
At the same time the military establishment  was perceived as the main obstacle 
to pro-Europeanism in Turkey, and thus, to opportunities for rapprochement. 
These two narratives intensified feelings of solidarity and sympathy for the 
  36 
AKP government, thus moving the discourse away from the traditional 
perception which held the Turkish state as a military adversary, and instead 
isolating the animosity in the discourse pertaining to the military establishment 
alone.  As a result, a new positive discourse developed regarding the new 
Turkish government’s11 European orientation and reform effort, in direct 
contrast to the condemnation of the military establishment. 
5.2. Turkish Reform Efforts linked to a ‘New Era’ in Greek-Turkish 
Relations 
The Greek press’s attitude towards the Turkish reform efforts was consistent 
with the recommendation and support captured in the Council Conclusions, 
viewing the reforms implemented by the AKP government as a necessary step 
towards initiating a ‘new era’ in Turkish politics and consequently in Greek-
Turkish relations, an era which would bring democratisation and westernisation 
to Turkey and, hence, limit the military’s intervention in policy making.  In this 
light, the Greek press on several occasions painted the picture of the AKP 
government as the key player in bringing democracy to Turkey after almost 
two decades, emphasising that “the realisation of these ambitious reforms will 
give a definitive end to the military rule over politics which was established 
with the 1980 coup” (To Vima 25/05/2003).  The Greek encouragement of 
Turkish reform efforts was grounded in the conviction that a neighbouring 
democratised and Europeanised Turkey would also enable negotiations and 
lead to an amelioration in bilateral relations.  
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 Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP Government 
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Upon assumption of the Presidency of the EU this belief became explicitly 
linked to open support for Turkish accession.   Turkish integration into Europe 
was presented as a possible panacea for its foreign policy towards Greece.  As 
one political commentator wrote: 
Greece, faced daily with the provocation of the Turkish military in the Aegean, 
has a great interest in helping to guide events towards an eventual Turkish 
Europeanisation […].  As long as this is postponed, there will be no credible 
counterpart on the other side of the Aegean with who we can discuss the 
resolution of the familiar issues (To Vima 08/06/2003).   
The commentaries echoed the conviction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
who was reported stating that “if the Turks start seeing us as EU partners, then 
we will find solutions” (Ta Nea 12/06/2003).   
At the same time, several analysts expressed concern about the possibility of 
Turkey not succeeding in opening accession negotiations, which they perceived 
as potentially destructive for Greek-Turkish relations.  Eleftherotypia’s 
Michalis Moronis discussed the Erdogan government’s problems in 
implementing the sixth package of reforms, which included the amendment of 
article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism law, in this light.  He concluded that “under 
these circumstances, any optimism regarding the resolution of Greek-Turkish 
issues in 2004 must be moderated […] as the Turkish accession becomes less 
and less certain” (Eleftherotypia 25/05/2003).    Similarly, To Vima reported 
that the greatest worry for Greece should be “the prospect of this crisis between 
the moderately Islamic government and the military turning into an open 
confrontation [and] becoming an obstacle for the country’s European prospect” 
(To Vima 08/06/2003).   
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This type of reasoning, also encountered in Kartalis’s piece, reinforced the 
1999 representations of the ‘no-veto’ policy followed in Helsinki as the way 
towards a successful future for Greek-Turkish relations. It also constituted a 
recommendation that the public should support Turkish accession, mirroring 
the government’s official policy.  On the one hand, the depiction of ‘official 
Turkey’ as grateful counterbalanced the stereotype of Ankara as provocative 
and uncompromising.  On the other hand, the Greek interest in seeing the 
problems in the Aegean resolved was specifically linked to Turkish 
Europeanization, to Turkish reform and, consequently, to supporting the AKP 
government.  The domestic problems in Turkey, which could potentially 
function as obstacles on the road of accession, were described as ‘worrying’, 
suggesting that in turn they were also obstructing Greek interests (To Vima 
08/06/2003). 
5.3. The United States and NATO in the Discourse on Turkey 
As far as relations between the US and Turkey were concerned, two key events 
figured prominently in the Greek press in 2003.  On the one hand, the new 
NATO Command structure of spring 2003 generated debate as to whether the 
Alliance had favoured Turkey more than Greece in the region.  At the same 
time, the launch of the war in Iraq led to a  reconfiguration of relations between 
Turkey and the US as the Turkish government did not endorse the US demands 
for material and political support at once and in full. The Greek press treated 
the disruption of traditionally friendly ties between them as a possible 
indication of the new Turkish government’s European rather than American 
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orientation.  The discourse on Turkey and the US shifted from treating Turkey 
as America’s protégé towards more positive depictions of the neighbouring 
state, as in this excerpt: 
The war in Iraq has had unexpected consequences for Turkey.  [...]Throughout 
the Cold War, the USA considered the Turkish military forces as their primary 
counterpart in discussions, as the factor that helped Turkey stay in the ‘western 
orbit’.  This view collapsed grandiosely on the eve of the war in Iraq.  […] 
Turkey’s failure to live up to the expectations of the American Pentagon has had 
other beneficial consequences: it has reversed its image as a satellite of the 
American military, an image which did not help the Turkish EU accession effort 
(To Vima 29/06/2003). 
The alignment of the Turkish state and public with the Greek public and press 
on the condemnation of the war in Iraq, brought about sympathy for Turkey.   
The perception of the US as an uncontrollable dictator, “arbitrarily exerting its 
power in the global order which had been fortified with the bombings of  
Kosovo in 1999, the counterattack in Afghanistan in 2001 and now with the 
invasion in Iraq” (Tsakona, 2006: 67), appeared to find the Turkish side in 
agreement, as reported by Kourkoulas who wrote from Ankara: 
From President Cezer to the nationalists of the governing party, and from former 
President Suleyman Demirel down to the last citizen of the country, everyone 
feels that the ‘big brother’ has taken it too far.  President Demirel characterises 
the [American] intervention ‘grotesque’ and ‘extreme’ and expresses his 
disappointment (To Vima 11/06/2003). 
Certain commentators viewed the transformation of Turkey’s relations with the 
USA as an indication that a Turkey with a less powerful military would be of 
less interest to the American administration.  Some voices in the press even 
suggested that the more ‘European’ Turkey became through its government’s 
reforms, the less influential it would be with its American allies.  This 
reasoning linked the military vs. government discourse with a new Greek 
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perception of US-Turkey relations and of Turkey’s potential accession to the 
EU: 
The generals know very well […] that the Americans do not need Turkey as they 
did in the past. After the war in Iraq, Washington has been creating new allies and 
bases in the region.  They also know that the Europeans will never accept Turkey 
unless the role of the military is reduced significantly (To Vima 18/06/2003). 
As NATO and the US occupy very similar positions in Greek public debates 
(Tsakona 2006), a second element of the Turkey-US narrative in June 2003 was 
the criticism of NATO’s new structure and the relative positions of Greece and 
Turkey. A week before the European Council in Thessaloniki, NATO’s 
Council of Foreign Ministers convened a meeting to decide on the future of the 
Alliance's Combined Air Operations Centres in Europe (CAOCs).  It was 
agreed that 11 out of 21 CAOCs would be terminated in light of the upcoming 
NATO enlargement.  Favourably for Greece, one of the CAOCs in Greece, 
Tyrnavos, was to be maintained and upgraded under the leadership of a newly 
appointed Greek commander.  The Greek press reported that the Greek case 
was an exception as other CAOCs, including that of Eski Sehir in Turkey, 
would continue to operate under American commanders. For some 
commentators this hinted to a slight shift of NATO preferences from Turkey to 
Greece12. The outcome of the new structure was described as “a loss for 
Ankara - at least in points” (Ta Nea 13/06/2003), “an upgrade of the Greek 
status in relation to the previous structure” (Eleftherotypia 15/06/2003) and an 
                                                 
12
 This came as a result of Turkey’s reluctance to cooperate with the USA during the 
launch of the war on Iraq, and, in particular, the refusal to allow use of the Incirlik 
military base. Along with the change of command, the June 2003 NATO reforms also 
terminated the Combined Air Operation Centres (CAOC) in Ismir.   
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indication that “NATO has shown its trust to Greece and its disappointment 
with Turkey, which lately appears not to be so cooperative with the USA” 
(Eleftherotypia 13/06/2003).   
American disenchantment with Turkey led to a significant decline in US 
involvement in Greek-Turkish affairs. This was welcomed by the Greek press, 
which emphasised, for example, US Ambassador Thomas Miller’s affirmation 
that “the difference is that in the past we used to be in the middle sometimes, 
whereas now the two countries are in direct dialogue, which is a much healthier 
situation” (To Vima 15/06/2003).  Miller was also quoted saying that “the 
Aegean and Cyprus are both part of Turkey’s agenda with the EU” (To Vima 
15/06/2003).  This was regarded as a positive development, whereby the USA 
admitted to the existence of new conditions in Europe, under which Greek-
Turkish disputes would be ‘uploaded’ to the level of European foreign policy 
and enlargement in particular.  Consequently, in contrast to previous years, the 
Greek media adopted a less aggressive stance towards the US on the issue of 
relations with Turkey. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The transformation of Greek foreign policy with respect to Turkey has often 
been treated as one of the main manifestations of Greek foreign policy 
Europeanization.  Briefly summarised, this refers to the Greek decision to 
embrace Turkey’s effort to join the EU as part of the resolution of the bilateral 
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disputes between the two states, and to adopt a ‘soft’, diplomatic, approach 
towards the resolution of these disputes.  It has been suggested in this paper 
that the Greek press functioned as a mediating factor in the realisation of this 
transformation and the promotion of the relevant discourses.  While traditional 
studies of the Greek media portray them as cultivating hostility against the 
‘Other’, most often represented by Turkey as a result of historical and cultural 
reasons, the picture derived from the cases analysed in this paper studies is that 
of an institution promoting discourses of rapprochement, consistent with the 
‘Europeanised’ Greek foreign policy  of the late 1990s. 
The discursive transformation in the press seems to have occurred gradually 
and subtly, more often following than leading government policy change. 
Essentially, the discursive categories through which issues related to Turkey 
and the EU were discussed remained similar throughout the seven year period 
studied.   However, in spite of the persistence of the general ‘framing’ of the 
discourse, its content, including the way in which the narratives evolved, was 
subject to the processes taking place on the EU level, both in terms of language 
and sources.  Nowhere was this more visible than in the war-related narrative.  
In the earliest case-study, matters of military and national defence featured 
prominently in the press where relations with Turkey were discussed.  The 
frequent references to statements by the Minister of Defence and his military 
counterparts in Turkey suggested a ‘readiness’ on both sides to resort to 
elements of ‘hard power’ for the resolution of bilateral disputes.  These 
references, coupled with the representation of Turkey as ‘provocative’, 
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‘threatening’ and ‘uncompromising’, contributed to the treatment of the 
possibility of war as a justifiable fear. While the imposition of conditionality, 
through the Luxembourg Conclusions, set in motion a process where resolution 
at the EU level gradually replaced the climate of tension, nevertheless, the 
sense of animosity, hostility and rivalry remained evident in the language 
employed to describe the conclusions as a ‘victorious battle’.  By the time of 
the Greek Presidency in 2003, the war discourse had become significantly 
downplayed and had been replaced by recommendations not to engage in 
‘heated scenarios’ which would involve confrontation with the Turkish military 
establishment.  Instead, the press had begun to call for the cultivation of 
relations with the official Turkish government, and to encourage the 
government’s support for Ankara’s European orientation.  The involvement of 
the Ministry of Defence in Greek-Turkish affairs was significantly downplayed 
and the dominant voices of authority were expanded to include EU decision-
makers and leaders across European states.   
Most significantly, the case studies have shown that the recognition of Turkey 
as a candidate state in the European Council’s Helsinki Conclusions in 1999, 
conveniently following the emergence of ‘earthquake diplomacy’, established 
an entirely new basis for the reporting on Turkey in the Greek press.  The 
hostility discourses were replaced by what might be described as ‘assistance 
discourses’, or, in other words, by discussions on the ways in which the EU, 
and Greece as a key EU member in the Balkan region, could assist in Turkey’s 
effort to ‘import Europe’.  It can be argued that the press endorsed the EU-
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derived discourse of ‘exporting Europe’ to the candidate states by means of 
promoting democratisation, respect for human rights and international law 
alongside with economic prosperity. Within this context, the press promoted a 
new role, and thus a new identity discourse for Greece and for its foreign 
policy, whereby the state’s mission was to support the Europeanization of its 
neighbour, rather than pursue the policy of military antagonism of the past.   
It is also noteworthy that, whereas initially Turkey’s human rights record was 
only referred to as an indication of its unsuitability to be part of Europe, 
gradually the discourse on human rights also became part of the narration on 
the neighbouring state’s effort to reform.  Similarly, Ankara’s initial depiction 
as ‘arrogant’, ‘uncompromising’ and ‘disobedient’ in its reactions to 
international and European agreements was transformed.  By 2003, the press 
reports on Turkey’s attitude towards international and EU law had evolved 
along two separate narratives: on the one hand, they described the military 
establishment in the traditional context of provocation and defiance attributed 
to Turkey; on the other hand, they also expressed strong support for the Turkish 
government’s effort for change and for adaptation to the acquis communautaire 
and to the EU’s criteria on democracy, rule of law and human rights.  Thus, on 
a discursive level, the conflict between Greece and Turkey was projected onto a 
conflict between European principles and the Turkish military order.  In this 
context, in the last case study, the Erdogan government began to be perceived 
in the narrative as an ally on the European/Greek side.  In essence, the 
elevation of the conflict to the level of principles on the basis of the EU 
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enlargement criteria reduced the significance of the military, hard conflict, 
consistently with  the EU-wide discourse on Europe as a soft-power and a 
normative power which appears to have permeated the Greek media approach 
to Greek-Turkish relations.  
It is, therefore, possible to argue that the analysis in this paper indicates that the 
Greek press has acted as a mediator for new foreign policy discourses 
stemming from the European-level approach to the Turkish case and from the 
Europeanised discourses on national foreign policy adopted by the Greek 
governments gradually after 1997. It was perhaps as a result of these discourses 
and their effect on public opinion during the same period, that by 2003 the 
Greek public came highest in support of EU enlargement among EU members 
and candidate states - not excluding Turkey - with 71% of the population 
favouring the accession of new states13.  This data could justify the position 
that rather than just reporting the gradual shift in government policy towards 
Turkey - or even by so doing - the press contributed to transforming the public 
perception of relations with Turkey. 
                                                 
13
 Eurobarometer 59 (Spring 2003). 
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